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ABSTRACT
Graph matching algorithms rely on the availability of seed vertex pairs as
side information to deanonymize users across networks. Although such al-
gorithms work well in practice, there are other types of side information
available which are potentially useful to an attacker. In this thesis, we con-
sider the problem of matching two correlated graphs when an attacker has
access to side information either in the form of community labels or an im-
perfect initial matching. First, we propose a naive graph matching algorithm
by introducing the community degree vectors which harness the information
from community labels in an efficient manner. Next, we analyze the ba-
sic percolation algorithm for graphs with community structure. Finally, we
propose a novel percolation algorithm with two thresholds which uses an im-
perfect matching as input to match correlated graphs. We also analyze these
algorithms and provide theoretical guarantees for matching graphs generated
using the Stochastic Block Model.
We evaluate the proposed algorithms on synthetic as well as real world
datasets using various experiments. The experimental results demonstrate
the importance of communities as side information especially when the num-
ber of seeds is small and the networks are weakly correlated. These results
motivate the study of other types of potential side information available to
the attacker. Such studies could assist in devising mechanisms to counter
the effects of side information in network deanonymization.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Graph matching algorithms have become a heavily researched topic in the re-
cent past [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Given two graphs, G1 and G2 with correlated
vertex and edge sets, a graph matching algorithm tries to find a mapping
between the vertex sets of G1 and G2. Graph matching algorithms find
relevance in different domains. For example, alignment of protein-protein
interaction (PPI) networks is an important step in understanding the biolog-
ical processes involved in cell interactions [7]. In this case, vertices of a graph
represent proteins and a direct physical interaction between two proteins is
represented by an edge.
Another domain, which is the focus of this work, is the study of privacy
risks involved in sharing data of social network users [9, 10, 11]. This data
helps data mining researchers in understanding network related properties
[12, 13, 14, 15, 16] as well as organizations to generate revenues using product
advertisements and recommendations [17, 18, 19, 20]. Although of great
utility, this data has the potential to leak user privacy [21, 22] and this
privacy-utility trade-off has been noted in the literature [23, 24]. Privacy
leakage is a very general problem [25, 26, 27, 28, 29], for example, delay-
privacy trade-off was studied in [30, 31] for router scheduling policies [32, 33].
Each user in a social network can be represented as a vertex, and an
interaction (friendship, message etc.) between two users is indicated by an
edge. The two networks, G1 and G2, may represent two different social
networks, for example Facebook and Google+, or may even be the snapshots
of the same network at two different times. The target network, G2, often
contains private information about network users, while real identities may
be known in the auxiliary network, G1. A correct mapping between the
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vertex sets of the two graphs results in associating private information in
G2 to real world individuals, which is a breach of user privacy. Identifying
individuals across two such networks is termed as network deanonymization.
Previous studies have focused on availability of some seed vertex pairs to
match correlated graphs. For example, Narayan and Shmatikov [6] success-
fully matched a fraction of users in two real world networks using a heuristic
algorithm. Nilizadeh et al. [5] incorporated the community level information
to improve upon this work. Wondracek et al. [34], solving a slightly different
problem, utilized the group membership information to identify users in a
network. Some studies also approached this problem from a theoretical view-
point. For example, Yartseva and Grossglauser [4] proposed and analyzed a
graph matching algorithm based on bootstrap percolation. Chiasserini et al.
[35] studied the effect of clustering on network deanonymization and showed
empirically that clustering can potentially decrease the initial seed set size
required to percolate in random geometric graphs.
Almost all of the recent works on network deanonymization have focused
only on one type of side information, i.e., seeds. This motivates us to ask the
following question: What side information, apart from seeds, could be avail-
able to the attacker and how could it be used in network deanonymization?
As more and more user data is being shared today, identifying such side
information and understanding the risk it poses to privacy is an important
problem. Such an understanding could help us in designing mechanisms to
counter the deanonymization attacks on the privacy of users.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, we explore the importance of community labels as side infor-
mation for network deanonymization. As a motivating example, consider the
work by Fire and Puzis [36]. They analyzed data from several commercial
organizations by mining data which their employees have exposed on Face-
book, LinkedIn, and other publicly available sources. They found that the
communities detected using the friendship links were highly correlated with
the position of the employees within the organization. More importantly,
the information about the level at which an employee works was available on
the public profiles of most employees. Similar information that is publicly
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available may include city of residence, college, major, age etc. This kind of
information can be used to partition the users into communities which can
potentially reduce the candidate set for many users and therefore assist in
the deanonymization process.
To analyze the problem theoretically, we consider two correlated graphs,
G1 and G2, generated using the Stochastic Block Model (SBM) [37]. Assum-
ing that an attacker has access to community labels in the two graphs, we
demonstrate the feasibility of the attacker using this information to assist
him in deanonymization. The contribution of this work is twofold. First, we
propose and analyze a naive algorithm which uses community degree vectors
of the network users to deanonymize them. Assuming that the number of
communities grows slowly with network size, we derive conditions on model
parameters such that it is possible to match the graphs perfectly using this
algorithm. Next, we analyze the simple percolation algorithm [4] for graphs
with community structure. We show that the matching threshold r = 2 is
sufficient to match almost all users correctly when the number of communi-
ties K = ω(log2n). Second, we propose a two-threshold percolation algorithm
which uses an imperfect matching as an input. The imperfect matching is
used to identify pairs of users which have high probability of being correct
pairs. These special pairs are assigned a lower threshold for the percolation
step, while the rest of the pairs are assigned a higher threshold. The use of
different thresholds for different kinds of pairs is useful in two ways. When
the correct pairs are more probable to get a lower threshold, the number of
seeds required to percolate decreases. Also, as the percolation algorithms
tend to make more errors in the beginning, mapping the correct pairs early
reduces the overall error made by the algorithm. Assuming that the algo-
rithm percolates, we derive conditions under which the algorithm does not
make an error with high probability.
We conduct experiments on synthetic as well as real world networks by
varying the number of seeds, levels of correlation, and fraction of community
labels known to the attacker. Based on our results, we find that availability
of side information in the form of community labels is very useful when (i)
the number of seeds is small, and (ii) the correlation between the datasets is
weak. We also find that the availability of community labels for a fraction
of users is enough for the proposed percolation graph matching algorithm to
perform better than other similar algorithms.
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In the end, we discuss some implications of our work and experimental
results for network privacy. We also discuss possible future directions and
questions that need to be answered in order to design better techniques to
mitigate the effects of side information in network deanonymization.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized into the following chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the
required preliminaries for the thesis and introduces the graph matching prob-
lem that the thesis aims to solve. Chapter 3 reviews the previous literature
related to the considered problem. We discuss works which use heuristic
algorithms followed by works with theoretical guarantees. Chapter 4 is the
main contribution of the thesis. We discuss three graph matching algorithms
with theoretical guarantees for matching random graphs. Chapter 5 evalu-
ates the proposed algorithm using various experiments on synthetic as well
as real datasets. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis with some discussion and
future directions.
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CHAPTER 2
THE GRAPH MATCHING PROBLEM
This chapter introduces the graph matching problem that the thesis aims to
solve. First, representation of social networks as graphs is discussed followed
by the Stochastic Block Model (SBM). Next, the process of generating cor-
related graphs is explained along with the attacker and problem description.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Social Networks as Graphs
As noted in previous literature [6, 5, 38, 39, 40], a social network can be
easily modeled as a graph (directed or undirected). In this thesis, the vertex
set of a graph G is denoted by V (G), while the edge set is denoted by E(G).
The users of a social network are represented as vertices in a graph whereas
the existence of an interaction (e.g. friendship link, messages etc.) between
two users is denoted by an edge between them. For the purpose of this thesis,
social networks are modeled as undirected graphs.
2.1.2 Stochastic Block Model
Communities are an integral part of any social network [41, 42, 43, 12].
Community detection in networks [44, 45, 46, 42] is one of the most widely
studied problem in social network analysis. The Stochastic Block Model
(SBM) is a random graph model used to generate graphs with community
structure [37]. The random graphs are generated as follows. Consider an n
vertex graph, G, with vertex set V (G) and edge set E(G). Also, let there
be a community label assignment function C : V (G)→ {1, 2, . . . , K} , [K],
where K is the number of communities in G. This function associates a
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Figure 2.1: A toy example for generating two correlated graphs.
community label with every vertex in G and hence partitions V (G) into
disjoint sets called communities. Let Ck , {v ∈ V (G) : C(v) = k} denote
the vertex set of the kth community. We assume that communities are equally
sized, i.e., |Ci| = |Cj|∀i, j ∈ [K]. Let P (X) denote the probability of an event
X. The edge set, E(G), is generated as follows. For vertices u, v ∈ V (G), let
P (uv ∈ E(G)) = p if C(u) = C(v); otherwise let P (uv ∈ E(G)) = q, where
p, q ∈ (0, 1) and both can depend on n. Here p and q denote the probability
that an edge exists between vertices belonging to the same community and
different communities respectively. The existence of an edge is independent of
the existence of any other edge. We assume that p ≥ q for the rest of this work
as the communities are assortative in real networks. The graph distribution
associated with this generative method is denoted by SBM(n, p, q,K). When
p = q or K = 1, this model degenerates to the Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph
model [47].
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2.2 Problem Formulation
2.2.1 Generating Correlated Graphs
We model the social networks by undirected graphs on n vertices. We use the
following model to generate correlated graphs. Consider an underlying graph
G with vertex set V (G) = {1, 2, . . . , n} , [n] and G ∼ SBM(n, p, q,K).
Generate graph G1 with V (G1) = V (G). The edge set, E(G1), is generated as
follows. For every edge e ∈ E(G), P (e ∈ E(G1)) = s and P (e ∈ E(G1)) = 0
if e /∈ E(G). The sampling of every edge is independent of other edges.
Generate G2 independently and identically. Figure 2.1 depicts a toy exam-
ple of this generating process. Note that this is the same model as used
in many previous studies [48, 2, 3]. We further assume that the vertices of
G2 are anonymized using naive anonymization in which any personal identi-
fiers are replaced by random identifiers. Although it is a simple anonymiza-
tion technique, naive anonymization is still the most widely used method
to anonymize datasets before publishing [6, 11]. Hence, we index the ver-
tices of G2 by {1′, 2′, . . . , n′} , [n′]. Without loss of generality, we assume
that i ∈ V (G1) and i′ ∈ V (G2) correspond to the same vertex in G. This
notation proves beneficial for the analysis later. It is useful to note that
G1, G2 ∼ SBM(n, ps, qs,K). Let the vertex set of the kth community in G1
and G2 be denoted by C
1
k and C
2
k respectively. More formally, for z ∈ {1, 2},
Czk = {v ∈ V (Gz) : C(v) = k}. We consider graphs with logarithmic average
degree, i.e., p = a logn
n
and q = b logn
n
, where a, b are constants which are
called model parameters. Also, the number of communities K = nα (unless
otherwise stated), α ∈ (0, 1], which means that the number of communities
grows with number of vertices sublinearly.
2.2.2 Modeling the Attacker
An attacker is any entity that aims to match the vertices of G1 to those
of G2, which in turn breaches the privacy of the users in a social network.
More formally, the goal of an attacker is to construct a bijective mapping
pi : V (G1)→ V (G2) such that pi = pi0 where pi0(i) = i′ for all i ∈ V (G1). We
call pi0 the ground truth mapping.
We will make three assumptions about the attacker (which assumption
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holds true is made clear in the particular sections later). First, an attacker is
assumed to have access to a set of seed vertices, S0 = {(i, i′) : i ∈ V (G1), i′ ∈
V (G2)}, |S0| = Φ. This set provides an attacker with Φ vertex pairs which
are already matched in the two graphs. Second, we also assume that the
attacker has access to community labels of all vertices in both the graphs.
For a vertex i ∈ V (G1), this information restricts the set of candidate vertices
to C2C(i). As discussed earlier, this information could be available on public
profiles in the form of job title, city of residence, college, major, age etc.
Third, an attacker has access to an imperfect matching of the graphs. This
information can be obtained from various sources, random guessing being
one. In this thesis, we analyze the importance of this side information in
matching correlated graphs.
Remark 1. We will only consider mappings which preserve the community
structure because we assume that an attacker knows the community labels of
the users. For the graph G1, let pi(E(G1)) , {pi(u)pi(v) : u, v ∈ V (G1), uv ∈
E(G1)}. Also, let pi−1 : V (G2)→ V (G1) denote the inverse of mapping pi.
Remark 2. Although the Stochastic Block Model is not completely repre-
sentative of the community structure found in real world networks, it is used
often in the theoretical analysis for problems involving communities in graphs.
The main reasons for this choice are as follows. First, it captures the assorta-
tivity property exhibited by the real networks. Second, the theoretical analysis
of the problem becomes tractable, and also results in providing an intuitive
explanation of the problem for real networks.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
The problem of graph deanonymization has become a hot area of research
in the past years. The problem has mostly been studied from a practical
viewpoint but some theoretical aspects have been studied as well. In this
chapter, we discuss some of the important literature associated with the
problem.
3.1 Heuristic Algorithms
Narayan and Shmatikov [6] were among the first researchers to study the
network deanonymization problem. They proposed a heuristic algorithm to
deanonymize users of a network when an adversary has access to a correlated
auxiliary network. The algorithm first identifies some seed vertex pairs and
then uses this information to propagate and map the remaining users. They
were successful in mapping a fraction of the users of Twitter and Flickr net-
works with small error rate. Nilizadeh et al. [5] extended this method to
incorporate the community structure of the networks. Utilizing the commu-
nity structure reduces the size of candidate user pairs and helps in identifying
more seed vertices, thereby reducing the error rate. They were able to map
correlated large Twitter networks with as few as 16 seeds. They also noted
that their method only works if the correlation between the networks is high.
Wondracek et al. consider the problem of deanonymizing users when their
communities’ memberships are known in a network. They also create com-
munity fingerprints of users by stealing their browser history. They showed,
by comparing fingerprints and memberships, that some of the users could
be identified uniquely while the candidate set is greatly reduced for others.
Although these works give insight into the problem of deanonymization, they
lack a theoretical framework. In contrast, we seek to understand the theo-
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retical aspects of these problems and provide results which emphasize the
importance of community structure in network deanonymization.
3.2 Algorithms with Theoretical Guarantees
Some efficient deanonymization algorithms have been proposed recently. Ji
et al. [1] analyzed the graph matching problem for the configuration model.
They proposed an optimization based deanonymization algorithm to match
the two graphs, but did not provide rigorous theoretical guarantees for the
algorithm. Yartseva and Grossglauser [4] proposed and analyzed a percola-
tion algorithm for matching correlated Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs. The algorithm
begins by considering a set of seed pairs which spread their marks to other
pairs of vertices. As soon as a particular pair of vertices reaches a fixed
threshold, r, it is considered as matched. They established a phase transi-
tion in the size of initial seed set for matching the graphs almost completely.
There are two main drawbacks of their method. First, the theoretical guar-
antee is only proved for r ≥ 4, which makes the algorithm impractical as
it requires a huge number of seeds in that case. Second, the threshold r
is same for all vertex pairs. This can be remedied by exploiting the graph
structure, which gives useful positive information about some vertex pairs
and could be used to assign a lower threshold to such pairs. In [3], Kazemi
et al. proposed a variant of percolation algorithm which requires fewer ini-
tial seeds but the error increases slightly compared to the former algorithm.
They also show that r = 2 is enough to match most of the vertex pairs with
o(n) pairs matched incorrectly. In contrast, our percolation algorithm utilizes
the community structure to identify two types of vertex pairs with different
thresholds which enables us to use fewer seeds. We also provide guarantees
such that it does not match, with high probability, wrong pairs of vertices.
3.3 Other Related Work
Recently, some information theoretic results have been derived for match-
ing correlated graphs drawn from random models. Pedarsani and Gross-
glauser [38] analyzed the graph matching problem theoretically for Erdo¨s-
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Re´nyi random graphs and derived an achievability result for matching two
correlated graphs perfectly. They established that the average degree has to
grow slightly faster than the logarithm of the size of the graphs in order to
achieve perfect deanonymization. Cullina and Kiyavash [49] improved upon
their result for achievability and also derived an almost tight converse for
the problem. In [50], Cullina et al. proved similar achievability and converse
results for the graphs drawn from the Stochastic Block Model. They also
derived conditions on model parameters which enable perfect community re-
covery while preventing perfect deanonymization simultaneously. Onaran et
al. [51] also derived an achievability result for this problem when the net-
work is divided into two possibly unequally sized communities. Ji et al. [48]
considered the exact as well as partial deanonymization problem when seed
vertex pairs are available to the attacker. They derived achievability bounds
for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs and extended the results to more general
graphs. Although these information theoretic results provide good insights
into the problem, they do not provide efficient algorithms to deanonymize
networks.
Very recently, Chiasserini et al. [52] proposed a deanonymization algorithm
for matching graphs with power law degree distribution. They use degree
distribution to divide the user pairs into categories. Based on their degrees,
the matching thresholds are assigned to these pairs. The algorithm first uses
higher threshold to match moderately higher degree users, then progressively
reduces the threshold to match low degree users, and in the end matches
users with very high degrees. Although they use different thresholds for
different pairs, the minimum threshold used is rmin = 3, and as seen in their
experiments, the algorithm requires many seeds to percolate when the scale-
free graphs are moderately correlated. In contrast, our algorithm requires
far fewer seeds to percolate even when the correlation between the datasets
is weak.
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CHAPTER 4
GRAPH MATCHING ALGORITHMS WITH
SIDE INFORMATION
This chapter discusses the main contribution of the thesis. We discuss three
graph matching algorithms in this chapter. The first, called naive algorithm,
leverages the community label information and does not require seeds to
match users across two correlated graphs. This is in contrast to most of
the algorithms proposed in the literature, which depend on seeds to match
users further. We derive an achievability bound for this algorithm, and thus,
identify the parameter space where the algorithm matches the graphs per-
fectly with high probability. The second algorithm is an extension of the
basic percolation algorithm [4] to graphs with community structure. We
show that when the community labels are known, the graph matching al-
gorithm becomes much easier and the matching threshold can be as small
as r = 2 when the number of communities is K = ω(log2n). The third al-
gorithm assumes that an imperfect matching of the users is given as input
and uses this information along with a modified percolation algorithm with
two thresholds. We derive conditions under which the imperfect information
helps the percolation algorithm to match users in the two graphs without
making errors.
4.1 The Naive Algorithm
Consider two graphs, G1 and G2, generated as in Section 2.2.1. For some
k0 ∈ [K], consider a vertex i ∈ C1k0 . For each k ∈ [K], let di(k) = |{j ∈ C1k :
ij ∈ E(G1)}| be the size of the neighborhood of i in community k. Similarly,
for a vertex j′ ∈ C2k0 define dj′(k). Then the community degree vector of i,
denoted by di, is defined as
di = [di(1), . . . , di(k0 − 1), di(k0 + 1), . . . , di(K)]T (4.1)
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Similarly, let dj′ denote the community degree vector of j
′. The community
degree vectors represent the pattern in which a user connects to various com-
munities in the network. If the number of communities is big enough, there is
a nontrivial amount of information in these vectors which can be utilized to
deanonymize the network. In particular, when the graphs are sparse, users
are connected to only a few communities, which results in enough informa-
tion to deanonymize the users in the network. Intuitively, we expect di to
be closer to di′ than dj′ for j
′ 6= i′. To make the further analysis tractable,
we define the distance between the pair (i, j′) as
dij′ =
K∑
k=1,k 6=k0
min(1, |di(k)− dj′(k)|) (4.2)
This distance measures the dissimilarity of the community degree vectors of
the vertices i and j′. If both i and j′ have the same number of neighbors in
a particular community, the contribution of this community to the distance
in (4.2) is 0. In all other cases, the contribution is 1.
We now propose a naive algorithm to match the graphs G1 and G2. This
algorithm works as follows. For every vertex i ∈ V (G1), the algorithm returns
j′i ∈ V (G2) such that i and j′i have the same community label and j′i is closest
to i in terms of the distance defined in (4.2), that is, j′i = argminj′∈C2C(i) dij′ .
The pseudo code is described in Algorithm 1. This algorithm is conceptually
simple and computationally efficient.
Algorithm 1 Naive Algorithm
Require: G1, G2, C
Compute the community degree vectors, di and dj′ , for all vertices i ∈
V (G1) and j
′ ∈ V (G2)
for all vertex pairs (i, j′) ∈ V (G1)× V (G2) such that C(i) = C(j′) do
Calculate dij′ using Equation (4.2)
end for
for i ∈ V (G1) do
j′i = argminj′∈C2C(i) dij′
Return (i, j′i) as a matched pair
end for
The rest of this section is aimed at deriving conditions under which the
above described algorithm matches the graphs G1 and G2 perfectly with high
probability. An important observation is that the individual terms in (4.2)
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are independent because they correspond to edges to different communities.
Also, they are identically distributed. We are interested in the conditions on
the model parameters such that P (dii′ ≥ dij′) → 0 as n → ∞ for all i and
j′. This means that all correct pairs of vertices are closer to each other, in
terms of distance in (4.2), compared to incorrect pairs, asymptotically with
high probability.
First, we bound the probability that an arbitrary incorrect pair of vertices
are closer to each other than the correct pair in terms of distance in (4.2).
Lemma 1. For any k0 ∈ [K], i ∈ C1k0, j′ ∈ C2k0, j′ 6= i′, and s > 0,
P{dii′ ≥ dij′} ≤ n−2bs(1−
√
1−s2)+o(1) → 0 as n→∞
Proof. We need to analyze P (dii′ − dij′ ≥ 0).
Let d(k) = min(1, |di(k)− di′(k)|)−min(1, |di(k)− dj′(k)|). We have
P (dii′ − dij′ ≥ 0)
= P (
K∑
k=1,k 6=k0
min(1, |di(k)− di′(k)|)
−
K∑
k=1,k 6=k0
min(1, |di(k)− dj′(k)|) ≥ 0)
= P (
K∑
k=1,k 6=k0
d(k) ≥ 0) (4.3)
Note that d(k)′s are independent and identical. Let pi = P (d(k) = i), i ∈
(−1, 0, 1). We have for any ϕ > 0,
P (
K∑
k=1,k 6=k0
d(k) ≥ 0) = P (eϕ
∑K
k=1,k 6=k0 d(k) ≥ 1)
≤ E(eϕ
∑K
k=1,k 6=k0 d(k)) = [E(eϕd(k))]K−1
= (p0 + p1e
ϕ + p−1e−ϕ)K−1
≤ exp((K − 1)(p0 + p1eϕ + p−1e−ϕ − 1))
≤ exp(−(K − 1)(√p1 −√p−1)2) (4.4)
Now we need to calculate p1 and p−1. Let dii′(k) = min(1, |di(k) − di′(k)|)
and dij′(k) = min(1, |di(k) − dj′(k)|). Also, let Di(k) denote the number of
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neighbors of vertex i in community k in the underlying graph G. Then
p1 = P (d(k) = 1)
= P (dii′(k) = 1, dij′(k) = 0)
=
n/K∑
mi=1
n/K∑
mj=0
P (Di(k) = mi, Dj(k) = mj)×
P (dii′(k) = 1, dij′(k) = 0|Di(k) = mi, Dj(k) = mj)
= P (dii′(k) = 1, dij′(k) = 0|Di(k) = 1, Dj(k) = 0)×
P (Di(k) = 1, Dj(k) = 0) + o(
nq
K
)
= P (Di(k) = 1, Dj(k) = 0) + o(
nq
K
)×
P (di(k) = 0, di′(k) = 1, dj′(k) = 0|Di(k) = 1, Dj(k) = 0)
= s(1− s)nq
K
(1− q) 2nK −1 + o(nq
K
)
= s(1− s)nq
K
(1− o(nq
K
)) + o(
nq
K
)
= s(1− s)nq
K
+ o(
nq
K
) (4.5)
Similarly,
p−1 = P (d(k) = −1)
= P (dii′(k) = 0, dij′(k) = 1)
= P (dii′(k) = 0, dij′(k) = 1|Di(k) = 0, Dj(k) = 1)×
P (Di(k) = 0, Dj(k) = 1) + o(
nq
K
)
+ P (dii′(k) = 0, dij′(k) = 1|Di(k) = 1, Dj(k) = 0)×
P (Di(k) = 1, Dj(k) = 0) + o(
nq
K
)
= s
nq
K
(1− q) 2nK −1 + s2nq
K
(1− q) 2nK −1 + o(nq
K
)
= s(1 + s)
nq
K
(1− o(nq
K
)) + o(
nq
K
)
= s(1 + s)
nq
K
+ o(
nq
K
) (4.6)
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So we have
P (
K−1∑
k=1
d(k) ≥ 0) ≤ exp(−(K − 1)(√p1 −√p−1)2)
= exp(−(K − 1)2snq
K
(1−
√
1− s2 ± o(1)))
= exp(−2nqs(1−
√
1− s2 ± o(1)))
= exp(−2bs(1−
√
1− s2 ± o(1)) log n)
≤ n−2bs(1−
√
1−s2)+o(1) (4.7)
Now, applying the union bound, the following theorem provides sufficient
conditions to match G1 and G2 perfectly using only the community degree
vectors.
Theorem 1. If b > 2−α
2s(1−√1−s2) , and s > 0, then the naive algorithm matches
the graphs G1 and G2 perfectly with high probability.
Proof. Let Pe denote the probability that at least one vertex of G1 is matched
incorrectly. Note that, for every vertex i ∈ V (G1), there are exactly n1−α
candidates j′. Using Lemma 1 and union bound over i, j′, we have
Pe ≤
⋃
i,j′
P (dii′ ≥ dij′)
≤ n2−α−2bs(1−
√
1−s2)+o(1)
→ 0 if b > 2− α
2s(1−√1− s2)
This result implies that when the inter-community edge probability is high
enough (recall that q = b logn
n
), the community degree vectors contain enough
information to de-anonymize all the users in the network.
Note that the right-hand side of the condition in Theorem 1 is a decreasing
function of s. When the value of s is large enough, the naive algorithm can
deanonymize even very sparse graphs. On the other hand, when s is small
(say s < 0.75), it requires denser graphs (large value of b) to deanonymize all
the users. Hence, the algorithm may not be very useful in practical scenarios.
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Even if it cannot deanonymize all the users, a small fraction of users are still
deanonymized correctly by the naive algorithm. In such situations, it can be
used as a preprocessing step to other algorithms. In the next chapter, we
show how the naive algorithm can be used to modify the constant threshold
percolation algorithm to achieve almost perfect deanonymization.
4.2 Percolation Algorithms
Percolation based graph matching algorithms have been recently proposed
in literature [4, 3, 53]. Such algorithms are computationally very efficient
while providing good deanonymization results. In this section, we describe
variants of the basic percolation algorithm [4] for matching correlated graphs.
We first review the basic percolation algorithm introduced in [4], followed by
the variant with community label information and the description of the
proposed algorithm with two thresholds.
4.2.1 Basic Percolation Algorithm
The basic percolation algorithm [4] begins by considering a seed set S0 as
defined in Section 2.2.2. At every time step, a seed pair (u, u′) is selected
from this set. For all potential vertex pairs (i, j′) ∈ V (G1)×V (G2) such that
(i, u) ∈ E(G1) and (j′, u′) ∈ E(G2), the score of the pair (i, j′), denoted by
Mij′ , is increased by one. When the score of a pair reaches a threshold r, it
is added to the seed set and all other pairs involving i and j′ are removed
from further considerations. If the size of the initial seed set is large enough,
then the algorithm percolates to n− o(n) correct vertex pairs if r ≥ 4.
4.2.2 Percolation with Community Label Information
Suppose that an attacker knows the community labels of the users in graphs
G1 and G2. We show that when the number of communities, K, is large
enough, the basic percolation algorithm percolates to n
K
−o( n
K
)
correct pairs
in each community with high probability. We establish this by using a better
union bounding technique than that used in [4].
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Assume a variant of the previous algorithm such that instead of picking a
seed at every time instant, the algorithm picks one seed from each community.
It is shown in [54] that the number of seeds needed to percolate in this case
is equivalent to the scenario when we pick seeds individually. The aim here is
to show that this algorithm does not make errors with high probability even
when r = 2. Hence, we will establish that the community label information
helps in relaxing the threshold from r = 4 to r = 2 and thus the algorithm
can percolate with small number of seeds.
Theorem 2. Let the percolation threshold be r ≥ 2. When the community
labels of the users in G1 and G2 are known, the percolation algorithm does
not make errors with high probability if K = ω(log2 n). Furthermore, the
critical number of seeds required to percolate to n
K
− o( n
K
)
vertices in each
cluster is upper bounded as Φ ≤ (1− 1
r
)
( Kr(r−1)!
n(p+(K−1)q)r
) 1
r−1 .
Proof. The proof is provided for r = 2, other values of r can be dealt in a
similar manner. Let k ∈ [K]. Consider a vertex pair (i, j′) ∈ C1k × C2k and
j′ 6= i′. Let Xij′(t) be the event that the pair (i, j′) is matched at time t. We
want to bound the probability of this event, P (Xij′(t)), conditioned on the
fact that before time t only correct pairs were matched. We have
P (Xij′(t)) ≤ P [Mij′(t) = 2,Mii′(t) ≤ 2,Mjj′(t) ≤ 2]
≤ P [Mij′(t) = 2]
= P [Bin(t, (ps)2) +Bin((K − 1)t, (qs)2) = 2]
≤ (t((ps)
2 + (K − 1)(qs)2))2
2
An important observation here is that, before time step t, the algorithm
already used t vertex pairs from every community. Hence, to union bound
the above probability only
(
n
K
− t) vertices remain to be considered at time
t. Now, we union bound the above probability as follows:
⋃
k,t,i,j′
P (Xij′(t)) ≤ K
n/K∑
t=1
( n
K
− t)2 (t((ps)2 + (K − 1)(qs)2))2
2
≤ C log
4 n
K2
for some constant C, which completes the first part of the proof. The second
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part follows in a straightforward manner from [54].
The above theorem shows that the number of communities needs to scale
just faster than log2n so that the percolation algorithm does not make errors
with r = 2. In this case, the community label information is very helpful in
decreasing the number of seeds required to percolate.
4.2.3 Two Threshold Percolation Algorithm
A drawback of the basic percolation algorithm [4] is that with r ≥ 4, the
algorithm requires many seeds to percolate. In fact, the number of seeds
required to achieve percolation is an increasing function of the threshold value
r. As has been noted in the literature [4, 3], the percolation algorithm makes
errors in the initial steps when there are only a few seeds to deanonymize the
graphs. Hence, to reduce such errors, we propose a two-threshold percolation
algorithm which takes as input an imperfect matching and builds upon this
information to percolate further. Assuming that the algorithm percolates,
we also prove the derive conditions under which the algorithm does not make
errors with high probability.
Consider, as before, two graphs G1 and G2, but we do not assume that
we have access to the community labels of the users. Suppose that there
exists an algorithm, A, which gives us the following output. For each vertex
i ∈ V (G1), let j′i ∈ V (G2) be the vertex matched to i using the algorithm A.
Let us call this set of matched pairs F . Consider two thresholds, rc and rm,
with rc < rm. For the percolation process, starting with a set of seed pairs,
S0, the following strategy is used. Pick a seed pair from the seed set. For
vertex i, the pair (i, j′i) is considered as matched as soon as its score, Mij′i ,
reaches rc. For all other potential pairs (i, j
′), the matching threshold is rm.
More compactly, the vertex pairs which were matched by algorithm A are
given a lower threshold than the other potential pairs. If algorithm A made
errors, we expect the percolation algorithm to correct them. Using a lower
threshold for the pair (i, j′i) is helpful in reducing errors in the initial stages
of the percolation process if j′i = i
′. As the correct pairs are more probable
to accumulate marks earlier than incorrect pairs [4], the lower threshold also
helps in reducing the required number of seeds. Hence, the more correct
pairs algorithm A matches, the fewer seeds required to percolate and the
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lower the error in the second step. Algorithm 2 describes the pseudo code of
the proposed algorithm.
Algorithm 2 Percolation Algorithm with Two Thresholds
Require: G1, G2,S0,F , {(i, j′i), i ∈ [n]}
S = S0,P = ∅,M = 0n×n
while S \ P 6= ∅ and |S| 6= n do
Pick a seed pair (u, v) ∈ S \ P
Add (u, v) to P
for all (i, j′) ∈ V (G1) × V (G2) such that ui ∈ E(G1) and vj′ ∈ E(G2)
do
Mij′ = Mij′ + 1
if ((j′i = j
′ and Mij′ = rc) ‖ (j′i 6= j′ and Mij′ = rm)) and both i, j′
are unmatched then
S = S ∪ (i, j′)
Mark i and j′ as matched
end if
end for
end while
Return S as the set of matched vertices
4.2.4 Asymptotic Analysis
The similarity of graph matching algorithms to bootstrap percolation is noted
in the literature [4]. The latter, in general, studies the spread of infection
among vertices in graphs where the infected vertices contribute to the in-
fection of their neighbors [55]. When the number of infected neighbors of
a vertex reaches a certain threshold, it gets infected as well. The graph
matching algorithm can be thought of along similar lines. Instead of vertices
spreading infection, it is the pair of vertices spreading it in the intersection
graph G∩ , G1∩G2 with vertex set V (G1) and edge set E(G1)∩pi−10 (E(G2)).
To make the two problems isomorphic, one first needs to establish that the
percolation algorithm does not make errors whenever it percolates. Next,
we analyze the proposed algorithm and derive conditions under which the
algorithm does not make errors with high probability. In particular we aim
to characterize the performance of algorithm A required to guarantee that
no errors are made while percolating.
We assume that algorithm A is independent of the percolation step and
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vice versa. The following theorem provides the conditions under which the
algorithm does not make errors with high probability, assuming that it per-
colates.
Theorem 3. Let rm ≥ 4 and rc ≥ 1. Consider any i ∈ V (G1) and
j′ ∈ V (G2). Let pf = P ((i, j′) ∈ F). If pf = o(nrc−3(log n)−2rc), then the
percolation algorithm with two thresholds does not match wrong pairs with
high probability.
Proof. Consider a vertex pair (i, j′) ∈ V (G1)×V (G2) and j′ 6= i′. Let Xij′(t)
be the event that the pair (i, j′) is matched at time t. We want to bound
the probability of this event, P (Xij′(t)), conditioned on the fact that before
time t only correct pairs were matched. Define a random variable fij′ as
fij′ =
1 if j′ = j′i0 if j′ 6= j′i
Now, we can bound the above probability as
P (Xij′(t)) ≤ P (fij′ = 1,Mij′(t) = rc,Mii′(t) ≤ rm,Mjj′(t) ≤ rm)
+ P (fij′ = 0,Mij′(t) = rm,Mii′(t) ≤ rm,Mjj′(t) ≤ rm)
= P (E1) + P (E2) (4.8)
where E1 is the event [fij′ = 1,Mij′(t) = rc,Mii′(t) ≤ rm,Mjj′(t) ≤ rm] and
E2 is the event [fij′ = 0,Mij′(t) = rm,Mii′(t) ≤ rm,Mjj′(t) ≤ rm]. Till time
t, let T1, and T2 be the random variables corresponding to the number of
seeds with community labels C(i) and C(j′) respectively. First, consider that
C(i) 6= C(j′) The other case is easier and can be proved in the same manner.
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Then
P (E2) ≤ P [Mij′(t) = rm]
=
t∑
t1=0
t∑
t2=t−t1
P [Mij′(t) = rm|T1 = t1, T2 = t2]P (T1 = t1, T2 = t2)
=
t∑
t1=0
t∑
t2=t−t1
P (Bin(t1 + t2, pqs
2) +Bin(t− t1 − t2, (qs)2) = rm)P (T1 = t1, T2 = t2)
(a)
≤
t∑
t1=0
t∑
t2=t−t1
P (Bin(t, pqs2) = rm)P (T1 = t1, T2 = t2)
≤ (tpqs2)rm
(b)
≤ (npqs2)rm
= (ab)rms2rmn−rm(log(n))2rm (4.9)
where (a) follows from q < p and because n(qs)2 → 0, and (b) follows from
t ≤ n. If rm ≥ 4, then⋃
i,j′,t
P (E2) ≤ (ab)rms2rmn3−rm(log(n))2rm → 0 (4.10)
For event E1, we have
P (E1) ≤ P [fij′ = 1,Mij′(t) = rc]
= P [fij′ = 1]× P (Mij′(t) = rc)
≤ pf (tpqs2)rc
Using union bound and the condition in the theorem, we have⋃
i,j′,t
P (E1) ≤ pf (ab)rcs2rcn3−rc(log(n))2rc → 0 (4.11)
Consider rc = 3. Then we need pf = o((log n)
−6). In this case, even
if algorithm A matches pairs randomly, the percolation algorithm does not
make any error. For rc = 2, algorithm A needs to do only a little better than
the random algorithm.
When the community label information is available, the naive algorithm
proposed earlier can be used as a preprocessing algorithm before percolation.
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In the next chapter we show experimentally that this algorithm, with rc = 1
and rm = 2, performs much better than similar graph matching algorithms.
This in turn shows that the community labels serve as excellent side infor-
mation, helping both in reducing the number of seeds needed to percolate
and achieving lower error rates.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this chapter, we evaluate the proposed algorithms on synthetic as well as
real world datasets. The first goal of the experiments is to show that the
proposed algorithm performs well on the real world datasets even though
the theoretical guarantees are provided for a particular graph model. Our
second goal is to show that information about community labels, if used
intelligently, enhances the deanonymization results especially when the cor-
relation between the networks is low.
In the experiments below, we compare the following algorithms:
• A1: percolation with rc = rm = 1
• A2: percolation with rc = 1, rm = 2 (proposed)
• A3: percolation with rc = rm = 2
• A4: ExpandWhenStuck Algorithm [3]
Algorithms A1 and A3 correspond to percolation graph matching with
uniform thresholds [4], but match vertices belonging to the same community
only. Algorithm A4 is the ExpandWhenStuck algorithm proposed in [3]. To
the best of our knowledge, it achieves the best time-accuracy trade-off for
matching large graphs. Algorithm A2 is the proposed algorithm which uses
two different thresholds for matching the graphs. We evaluate the algorithm
with rc = 1 and rm = 2, which achieves excellent results with minimal seeds.
We compare the performance of the algorithms in terms of percolation
strength and error rate with varying numbers of seeds (Φ) and values of
sampling parameter (s). For all the experiments, the seeds are chosen uni-
formly at random. To measure the percolation strength we compare the
fraction, f , of vertices matched by the algorithms, i.e., f = #vertices matched
n
.
The error rate, e, is measured by the fraction of vertices matched incorrectly,
i.e., e = #incorrect matches
#vertices matched
.
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Table 5.1: Statistics of Astro Physics and Condense Matter Physics
Datasets
Datasets As-Physics CondMat
No. of Users (n) 17903 21363
No. of Edges 196972 91286
Average Degree 22.01 8.55
Clustering Coefficient 0.63 0.63
No. of Communities (K) 36 55
5.1 Description of Datasets
We evaluate the proposed algorithm on synthetic as well as real world datasets.
For the synthetic networks, the underlying graph, G, is generated using the
Stochastic Block Model with parameters n = 10000, and b = 2 (unless stated
otherwise). The real world datasets are the collaboration networks of authors
who submitted papers to Astro Physics (As-Physics) and Condensed Matter
Physics (CondMat) categories on arXiv [16]. In these networks, two authors
are connected if they co-authored a paper. We consider only the largest con-
nected component in these graphs. We run Louvain community detection
algorithm implemented in Pajek on the underlying graph to detect the com-
munity structure [56]. The statistics of these datasets are provided in Table
5.1. To generate correlated networks, G1 and G2, we sample the edges in the
underlying graphs with probability s (values of s are described in subsequent
subsections). As we aim to demonstrate the importance of community labels
in graph matching, we assume that the attacker knows the community labels
of the vertices.
5.2 Probability of Error
Although the results derived in this paper hold asymptotically, it is important
to assess their validity on finite graphs. Let perr denote the probability
that the proposed percolation algorithm makes an error. To evaluate this
probability, we generate 200 random instances of the problem and match
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Figure 5.1: Probability of error versus parameter b for SBM graphs with
s = 0.7.
graphs G1 and G2 using the proposed algorithm. Let nerr denote the number
of instances when the proposed algorithm makes an error. Then, we have
perr =
nerr
200
. Figure 5.1 shows the obtained results as a function of parameter
b for two values of K and s = 0.7. For small values of b, perr is high and
it decreases as b increases. For large values of b and K = 10, the algorithm
attains perr of around 0.08 while for K = 20, perr is almost zero. This shows
that more side information in the form of community labels is extremely
helpful in matching the graphs.
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Figure 5.2: Effect of number of communities on the error rate of the naive
algorithm for SBM graphs with parameters n = 10000, b = 2.
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Figure 5.3: Effect of number of communities on the performance of the
proposed percolation algorithm for SBM graphs with parameters
n = 10000, b = 2, s = 0.5.
5.3 Effect of Number of Communities
We first measure the influence of number of communities on the proposed
naive (Algorithm 1) and percolation (A2) algorithms. Figure 5.2 shows the
error rate achieved by the naive algorithm for SBM graphs with different
values of the sampling parameter. It can be noted that as the number of
communities increases, the error rate decreases. For larger values of s, even
a very small number of communities is enough to deanonymize a large per-
centage of users.
In Figure 5.3, we depict the performance of algorithm A2 for s = 0.5. For
K = 10, the algorithm requires around 245 seeds to percolate as virtually all
the correct pairs of vertices get a higher threshold using the naive algorithm
in the first step (see Figure 5.2). However, for K = 20, the number of seeds
required to percolate decreases drastically to 35 even though the fraction of
correct pairs assigned a lower threshold is less than 10%. As the number of
communities increases further, a greater fraction of correct pairs get lower
threshold and hence percolation is immediate for larger values of K. This
shows that the performance of our algorithm improves with the number of
communities as expected. With only 20 communities, the algorithm achieves
less than 0.4% error rate although the correlation between the networks is
very weak.
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Figure 5.4: Box plot comparing distributions of error rate for algorithms
A2 and A4 for 100 random seed sets of size 5. X and Y represent
algorithms A4 and A2 respectively. Suffixes 1,2, and 3 represent datasets,
1: SBM (s = 0.8, K = 20), 2: CondMat (s = 0.7), 3: As-Physics (s = 0.7).
Box represents the Inter Quartile Range (IQR), horizontal line in the box
denotes the median, +, ◦ denote mean and outliers respectively, horizontal
lines above and below the box denote maximum and minimum respectively.
5.4 Effect of Seeds
First, we compare the variation in the performance of algorithms A2 and A4
by varying the initial seed set S0. We use 100 random seed sets of size 5 to
obtain the results. Figure 5.4 shows the comparison of error rate distributions
for three datasets. It can be seen that our algorithm is insensitive whereas
algorithm A4 is highly sensitive to the quality of seeds. We observed during
the experiments that the median provides a good estimate of the error rate
for algorithm A4. Also, as the median is robust to outliers, we report the
median of error rates over 100 random seed sets for algorithm A4 in the
experiments.
Figure 5.5 shows the deanonymization results for the synthetic networks
with s = 0.8 and K = 20 for varying number of seeds. Figure 5.5(a) depicts
the percolation behavior of the algorithms. Algorithm A3 is dropped because
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Figure 5.5: Deanonymization results for SBM dataset with parameters
n = 10000, b = 2, s = 0.8, and K = 20.
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Figure 5.6: Deanonymization results for As-Physics dataset with s = 0.9.
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Figure 5.7: Deanonymization results for CondMat dataset with s = 0.7.
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it required more seeds to percolate than the other three algorithms. It can
be seen that all three algorithms percolate instantaneously, but the proposed
algorithm A2 maps almost the complete network. Note that algorithm A4
achieves the same number with 10 seeds. The error rate comparison is shown
in Figure 5.5(b). The proposed algorithm outperforms both algorithms A1
and A4 and achieves near zero error rate with only 1 seed. It is interesting
to note that algorithm A4 is able to perform well with around 5 seeds and
is worse than A1 for fewer seeds.
Figure 5.6 shows the deanonymization results for the As-Physics dataset
with s = 0.9. The fractions of users in the intersection with degree greater
than or equal to 1 and 2 are approximately 98% and 90% respectively. The
community detection algorithm partitions the network into 36 disjoint com-
munities. It can be noted that using constant threshold rc = rm = 1, algo-
rithm A1 maps around 83% of the users but results in very high error rate.
Algorithm A3 needs around 9 seeds to percolate to 72% of the users. The
error rate in this case is more than 40%. The proposed algorithm performs
much better than the other two. It maps more than 82% users with error
rate around 24%. Also note that our algorithm percolates with only 2 seeds.
Although algorithm A4 maps more users, our algorithm achieves lower error
rate.
Figures 5.7 shows the deanonymization results for the CondMat dataset,
which is much sparser than the previous dataset, with s = 0.7. The fractions
of users with degrees at least 1 and 2 in the intersection graph are around 96%
and 70% respectively. Algorithm A1 resulted in more than 80% error rate
and algorithm A3 needed more than 20 seeds to percolate hence the results
of these algorithms are not shown. The other two algorithms percolate with
only 2 seeds, as can be seen in Figure 5.7(a), with algorithm A4 mapping
slightly higher number of users than the proposed algorithm. However, as
depicted in Figure 5.7(b), the former algorithm makes more errors than our
algorithm. Figure 5.7(b) also shows the IQR for algorithm A4. Note that
even the 25th percentile is well above the error rate achieved by the proposed
algorithm, even with 10 seeds.
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5.5 Effect of Sampling Parameter
In this subsection, we compare the performance of algorithms by varying the
levels of correlation. In the first experiment, we compare the percolation
threshold (minimum number of seeds required to percolate) of algorithms
A2 and A3 for the synthetic dataset with K = 10, 20. As seen in Figure
5.8, the proposed algorithm requires far fewer seeds to percolate than the
percolation algorithm with uniform threshold. In particular, for s = 0.5,
assigning a lower threshold to less than 10% correct pairs (see Figure 5.2)
changes the percolation threshold from 285 to 35 for K = 20. At higher
values of s, algorithm A2 requires only 1 seed to percolate. Also note that
for K = 20, the algorithm requires fewer seeds than for K = 10. The
reason for this is the fact that when K = 20, more correct pairs get a lower
threshold for matching. This highlights the importance of community labels
as side information, especially when number of communities is bigger.
In the next set of experiments, we compare the overall performance of the
algorithms A1-A4 on synthetic and real datasets. The number of seeds is
fixed at 10 for all the experiments. To measure the performance, we use the
F1-score defined as follows:
F1 = 2
PR
P +R
(5.1)
where P = 1− e, R = #correct matches
nint
are the precision and recall respectively.
Here nint is the number of vertices in the giant component of the intersection
graph G∩. The F1 score combines both the percolation strength and error
rates achieved by the algorithms into a single index. An F1 score closer to
1 means better performance of an algorithm in terms of both percolation
strength and error rate.
Figure 5.9 shows the F1 scores for the synthetic dataset with K = 20.
Algorithm A3 is not shown as it did not percolate for any value of s. Note
that our algorithm outperforms algorithm A1 for most values of s; at s = 0.5
our algorithm did not percolate. Compared to algorithm A4, our algorithm
achieves better scores when the datasets are weakly correlated (s ≤ 0.7).
Even when s = 0.8, our algorithm is slightly better than algorithm A4.
Figure 5.10 shows the F1 scores for the As-Physics dataset. As before,
for low values of s, the proposed algorithm outperforms the other three algo-
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rithms. Algorithm A1 percolates, but makes many errors and hence achieves
low scores even at higher values of s. At s = 0.9, the proposed algorithm
obtains a score which is better by a value of 0.1 than that of algorithm A4.
Note that the IQR at s = 0.7 for A4 is large, which shows the sensitivity of
the algorithm to the quality of seeds.
Figure 5.11 shows the F1 scores for the CondMat dataset. At high values
of s, algorithm A4 achieves slightly better scores than the proposed algo-
rithm. However, at lower values, the proposed algorithm outperforms other
algorithms. It is worth noting that algorithm A4 results in almost 100%
error rate for s ≤ 0.6, although it percolates.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we investigate the importance of side information in graph
matching problems. We first propose a graph matching algorithm based on
the community degree vectors and provide theoretical guarantees for match-
ing graphs generated using the SBM perfectly. We analyze the basic perco-
lation algorithm for graphs with community structure. Using an imperfect
matching as input, we also propose a novel percolation algorithm with two
thresholds to match two correlated graphs. We prove the conditions under
which the algorithm does not make errors whenever it percolates. We show
that our algorithm performs extremely well on the synthetic and real world
networks and outperforms other percolation algorithms when the correlation
between the networks is low. We also show that our algorithm percolates
with only a few seeds, is robust to the quality of seeds and works well even
when the community labels are known only for a fraction of users.
There are two main practical implications of our work. First, it shows that
side information in the form of community labels has the capability to assist
an attacker in network deanonymization, especially in the low correlation
regime. Most of the datasets released publicly are only weakly correlated,
for example, a person would have very few common friends on Facebook
and LinkedIn social networks as these are meant for different purposes. For
such datasets, community label information may pose a threat to user pri-
vacy. Second, in situations where the correlation is strong, information about
community labels helps in reducing the number of seeds needed to percolate
and mitigates the effect of seed quality on the deanonymization results.
There are various future directions to explore as a result of our findings.
For example, it is pertinent to study other types of side information which
could help an attacker to match correlated networks. Such studies could
help in designing mechanisms to mitigate the effect of such side information
in network deanonymization. Studying similar two-threshold percolation al-
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gorithms for other random graph models like preferential attachment [57],
and configuration models [58], can provide more insights into the problem of
matching real world graphs. A more realistic modification of this problem in-
volves considering overlapping communities. We would like to point out that
our algorithm can be modified to account for overlapping communities, but
a theoretical analysis of this problem would be more challenging. We expect
our results to motivate research in these directions in order to understand
the graph matching problem more concretely.
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